But the issue did not become a major philosophical problem until it was taken up by Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Like many scholastic philosophers, Aquinas believed that God is perfectly simple and that created beings, in contrast, have a composite character that accounts for their finitude and imperfection. Earthly creatures are composites of matter and form the doctrine of hylomorphism , but since purely spiritual beings are immaterial, Aquinas located their composite character in the distinction between essence and existence.
The primary interest of his theory for our purposes, however, is that it led to a lively debate among his successors both as to how to interpret the master and about the true nature of the relation between essence and existence in created things.
This debate produced three main positions:. Proponents of the first view conceived the distinction between essence and existence as obtaining between two separate things. The theory of real distinction was also considered objectionable for philosophical reasons.
On the theory of real distinction, this view leads to an infinite regress. If an essence becomes actual only in virtue of something else — viz. Wippel, , f. In response to these difficulties some scholastic philosophers developed a position at the polar extreme from the theory of real distinction.
As the term suggests, this theory held that essence and existence of a creature are identical in reality and distinguished only within our thought by means of reason. Needless to say, proponents of this theory were forced to distinguish purely spiritual entities from God on grounds other than real composition.
Giving up the doctrine of real composition seemed too much for another group of thinkers who were also critical of the theory of real distinction. Articulating this theory in an important passage in the Principles of Philosophy , Descartes claims that there is merely a distinction of reason between a substance and any one of its attributes or between any two attributes of a single substance , AT 8A; CSM Since thought and extension constitute the essence of mind and body, respectively, a mind is merely rationally distinct from its thinking and a body is merely rationally distinct from its extension , AT 8A; CSM But Descartes insists that a rational distinction also obtains between any two attributes of a substance.
Since existence qualifies as an attribute in this technical sense, the essence and existence of a substance are also distinct merely by reason , AT 8A; CSM Descartes reaffirms this conclusion in a letter intended to elucidate his account of the relation between essence and existence:. Indications are given here as to how a rational distinction is produced in our thought. Descartes explains that we regard a single thing in different abstract ways. Case in point, we can regard a thing as existing, or we can abstract from its existence and attend to its other aspects.
In so doing, we have distinguished the existence of a substance from its essence within our thought. Like scholastic proponents of the theory of rational distinction, however, Descartes is keen to emphasize that this distinction is purely conceptual.
In reality they are identical. He extends the theory of rational distinction from created substances to God. In general, the essence and the existence of a substance are merely rationally distinct, and hence identical in reality.
One of the most important objections to the argument is that if it were valid, one could proliferate such arguments for all sorts of things, including beings whose existence is merely contingent. By supposing that there is merely a rational distinction between essence and existence abroad in all things, Descartes seems to confirm this objection.
In general, a substance is to be identified with its existence, whether it is God or a finite created thing. The problem with this objection, in this instance, is that it assumes that Descartes locates the difference between God and creatures in the relation each of these things bears to its existence. This is not the case. In a few important passages, Descartes affirms that existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of every single thing, but he also insists that there are different grades of existence:.
In light of this passage and others like it, we can refine the theory of rational distinction. What one should say, strictly speaking, is that God is merely rationally distinct from his necessary existence, while every finite created thing is merely rationally distinct from its possible or contingent existence. The distinction between possible or contingent existence on the one hand, and necessary existence on the other, allows Descartes to account for the theological difference between God and his creatures.
Now, when Descartes says that a substance be it finite or infinite is merely rationally distinct from its existence, he always means an actually existing substance. So how are we to understand the claim that a finite substance is merely rationally distinct from its possible existence?
It is tempting to suppose that this term means non-actual existence. But as we saw already with the case of necessary existence, Descartes does not intend these terms in their logical or modal senses. After all, Descartes contrasts possible existence not with actual existence but with necessary existence in the traditional sense.
This result explains why Descartes believes that we cannot proliferate ontological arguments for created substances. It is not that the relation between essence and existence is any different in God than it is in finite things. In both cases there is merely a rational distinction. The difference is in the grade of existence that attaches to each. Whereas the concept of an independent being entails that such a being exists, the concept of a finite thing entails only that it has dependent existence.
Looking back at the problematic passage cited above from the Fifth Replies, it becomes clear that Descartes intended something along these lines even there. What distinguishes God from creatures is his grade of existence. We can produce an ontological argument for God, and not for finite substances, because the idea of a supremely perfect being uniquely contains necessary — or ontologically independent — existence.
But when the complete apparatus of the Cartesian system is brought forth, the argument proves itself to be quite resilient, at least on its own terms. These two doctrines inoculate Descartes from the charge made against Anselm, for example, that the ontological argument attempts to define God into existence by arbitrarily building existence into the concept of a supremely perfect being.
In the Third Meditation, the meditator discovers that her idea of God is not a fiction that she has conveniently invented but something native to the mind.
As we shall see below, these two doctrines provide the resources for answering other objections as well. Given our earlier discussion concerning the non-logical status of the ontological argument, it may seem surprising that Descartes would take objections to it seriously. He should be able to dismiss most objections in one neat trick by insisting on the non-logical nature of the demonstration. This is especially true of the objection that the ontological argument begs the question.
Unfortunately, not all of the objections to the ontological argument can be dismissed so handily, for the simple reason that they do not all depend on the assumption that we are dealing with a formal proof. Although it is often overlooked, many of the best known criticisms of the ontological argument were put to Descartes by official objectors to the Meditations. He in turn responded to these objections — sometimes in lengthy replies — though many contemporary readers have found his responses opaque and unsatisfying.
We can better understand his replies and, in some cases, improve upon them by appealing to discussions from previous sections. Johannes Caterus, the author of the First Set of Objections to the Meditations , puts the point as follows:.
The principle of clear and distinct perception is intended to do just that. According to this principle, for which he argues in the Fourth Meditation, whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives or understands is true — true not just of ideas but of things in the real world represented by those ideas.
The previous objection is related to another difficulty raised by Caterus. In order to illustrate that the inference from the mental to the extra-mental commits a logical error, critics have observed that if such inferences were legitimate then we could proliferate ontological arguments for supremely perfect islands, existing lions, and all sorts of things which either do not exist or whose existence is contingent and thus should not follow a priori from their concept.
The trick is simply to build existence into the concept. One of his first moves is to introduce a point that we discussed earlier see passage [5] in section 2 , namely that existence is contained in the idea of every thing that we clearly and distinctly perceive: possible or dependent existence is contained in our clear and distinct idea of every finite thing and necessary or independent existence is uniquely contained in the idea of God AT ; CSM So for Descartes one does not have to build existence into the idea of something if that idea is clear and distinct; existence is already included in every clear and distinct idea.
But it does not follow that the thing represented by such an idea actually exists, except in the case of God. We cannot produce ontological arguments for finite things for the simple reason that the clear and distinct ideas of them contain merely dependent existence. This being could powerful to not only manipulate our senses, but to cast doubt over other things. The points formed deal with the allegory of the sun and the stone, explain that God is the only perfect being, explain that God is not a deceiver and finally prove the existence of the external world.
In relation to Descartes proof of the existence of God one must understand that for Descartes innate means, having a natural notation of an idea within the mind.
First, proving that the existence of God is true. Second, the fact that God is not a deceiver tricking Descartes into perceiving something to be true when in reality it is false. But the Meditator remains unsatisfied. If God is a perfect creator, God should be able to create perfect beings.
Surely, God could have willed it so that the Meditator would never err, and God always wills what is best. The Meditator reflects that God's motives and reasons are incomprehensible to finite beings such as himself. For this reason also, he rejects the search for final causes in physics: it would require a great deal of arrogance to try to read God's mind or understand God's motives.
Rather than look at one isolated part of the universe, the Meditator suggests he might find perfection if he looks at God's creation as a whole. He may appear to be an imperfect being when considered on his own, but he may play a perfectly appropriate role in the wider context of a perfect universe. In Descartes' denial that God could be a deceiver, he is employing a conception of power and existence that would have been familiar in his day, but which might strike us as rather odd today.
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